

VII. The Importance of Damonian Theory in Plato's Thought ¹

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In a number of his dialogues, most notably in the *Republic* and *Laws*, Plato deals with the supposed effects of music upon the soul. The ethos or ethical character believed to be resident in rhythm and mode, and transferred thence to our innermost natures, is most often considered in a paideutic frame of reference; and the Platonic Socrates clearly acknowledges indebtedness to Damon, the most famous musical authority of the Periclean Age (though he seems to have been neither executant nor composer)² and an intimate associate of Pericles himself. Hitherto it has always been supposed that in his views on musical ethos Plato draws directly on Damonian theory, without any attempt to be original.³ This paper seeks to

¹ A number of the arguments presented here appeared in an unpublished thesis, "*Paideia* and Ethos in Hellenic Music, with Special Reference to Literary Evidence regarding the Modes," submitted to the faculty of the Graduate School of Harvard University.

² As Cicero (*De or.* 3.33, sec. 132) observes, Damon addressed himself not merely to the particular but to the universal in music. He means that Damon was not to be numbered with the mere technicians, the pure historians or scientists (arithmeticians or geometricians — sometimes both, though normally the two belonged to opposing schools), of musical theory. Technicalities were by no means alien to him; yet his vital concern was not, as so often, with the means but rather with the end.

³ Such, for example, is the strongly expressed view of the authors of the articles on Damon in *RE*: von Jan, 4.2072–74, and Kroll, Suppl. Vol. 3.324–25. On Damonides, see Kirchner, *RE* 4.2075. For the problem of confusion in the ancient sources between Damon and his father Damonides, see most recently A. E. Raubitschek, "Damon," *ClMed* 16 (1955) 78–83, and the references there given to the work of del Grande, Ehrenberg and other contemporary scholars. Professor Raubitschek summarizes his conclusions (83) as follows: Damon's period of activity was the last third of the fifth century; during these thirty years he was an intimate of Pericles, and suffered ostracism at a time when Pericles himself and his other friends came under attack; it was his father Damonides who, about thirty years earlier, proposed to Pericles that jury pay be introduced. The evidence given in support of these conclusions seems to outweigh the arguments of A. E. Taylor, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus* (Oxford 1928) 15 f.; nor does the reference by Plato Comicus (*fr.* 181 Kock) to Damon as Pericles' "Chiron" warrant our supposing that he was Pericles' earliest teacher, as is held by Compton Mackenzie, *Pericles* (London 1937) 28. Plato (*Alc. I* 118c.5 f.) expressly says of Pericles *καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλικούτος ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν*, distinguishing this association from the earlier periods of study with Pythocleides and Anaxagoras.

show that, while Damon's influence was real and important up to a certain point, there are good reasons why Plato should be credited with vigorous independence in several prominent aspects of his musical-ethical thinking.

Outside the dialogues one finds the following beliefs presented as Damon's: (1) "Song and dance necessarily arise when the soul is in some way moved; liberal and beautiful songs and dances create a similar soul, and the reverse kind create a reverse kind of soul." (2) "Through similarity, the notes of a continuous melody create a character that did not exist in boys and in those more advanced in years, and also bring out the latent character." (3) "In singing and playing the lyre, a boy ought properly to reveal not only courage and moderation, but also justice."⁴

Damon was not the only Pre-Socratic to speculate on musical ethos,⁵ but in no other thinker can one find comparably precise views, views which in their coördinate form obviously represent a carefully elaborated theory of ethos. If Damon did not invent this theory, he did expand and codify it in a notable, and perhaps previously unparalleled, degree. During the latter part of the fifth century and even after the Peloponnesian War, his views were accepted above those of all others. Aristophanes disagreed,⁶ to be

⁴ Diels, *Vors.* 37B 6 (Athen. 628c), 7 (Aristid. Quint. p. 95 Meibom), 4 (Philod. *Mus.* 3.77.13-17, p. 55 Kemke), translated from the fifth edition by Kathleen Freeman, *Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* (Oxford 1948) 71. In the last selection "ought properly to" is a correction of Miss Freeman's "will be likely to."

⁵ The earlier history of the theory of ethos in Greek thought remains largely an enigma; yet one seems to discern it here and there, for a moment at least. The excerpts surviving from Philolaus' treatise strongly indicate that Pythagoras thought along lines consistent with a theory of ethos; Pindar states that "the Dorian melody is (?the) most solemn" (*fr.* 67 Schroeder = Schol. *Ol.* 1. 26); Philolaus himself associates "number and harmony" with the inherent exclusion of "falsehood and envy" (*Vors.* 44B 11); and Democritus, author of two tetralogies on music and exponent of the belief that children learn reverence by musical studies (*ibid.* 68B 179), must have been concerned with questions of ethos.

⁶ Cf. esp. *Nub.* 648 ff., where the Damonian school would naturally have been thought of by the ordinary citizen with any knowledge at all of rhythmic theory. Aristophanes' attitude is that of a practising poet-composer, not a philosopher: he did not deal with theory, either his own or that of the opposition, but with the respects in which he thought his art endangered. It cannot be assumed that he knew Damon personally, since the two men represent different generations; on the other hand, it is almost inconceivable that he should not have become acquainted with Damon's ideas. The historical Socrates, as distinct from the Platonic Socrates or Plato himself, may have been a good friend of Damon's. Diogenes Laertius (2. 19) says Socrates studied under him; but the dialogues, which mention Damon in a musical context, say at least twice that Socrates took music lessons with one Connus (*Euthyd.* 272c.1-5, cf. 295d).

sure, and in the so-called Hibeh musical papyrus we have an anonymous attack,⁷ dating probably to about 390, against extremist followers of the harmonicist school of Damon. Nonetheless, there appears to have been no real spokesman for the opposition until Aristoxenus, the most gifted in musical theory of all Aristotle's pupils, championed the cause of the empiricists.

Plato's references to Damon give an initial impression of admiration for, and agreement with, the celebrated Periclean *mousikos*. He is praised by Nicias in the *Laches* (180D.3) as thoroughly versatile and highly accomplished, fit in the highest degree to associate with young men; and Socrates informs Laches that Nicias' skill (*sophia*) in argument regarding the nature of courage derives from "my friend Damon," who is a close associate of Prodicus, considered the best of all the Sophists at drawing distinctions with regard to such terms (197D.1-5). Later Laches expresses sarcastic surprise that Nicias has not been enabled "through the wisdom you got from Damon" to find out what courage is (200A.1 f.). Again, in the *Republic* (400B.2-c.5), when Glaucon confesses he cannot say which kinds of rhythm express which kinds of life, Socrates at once proposes that the expert advice of Damon be sought, and touches with studied vagueness on certain elementary examples of Damonian metrical theory, for all the world as if they were Eleusinian mysteries.⁸ Finally, Socrates declares he believes Damon's thesis (424C.5

3-5; *Menex.* 235E.10-236A.1, if this can be given any credence). Indications of a disagreement between Aristophanes and Socrates may be found in that rejection of tragic drama which is normally associated with Plato, especially with the positions most clearly taken up during his later period. Actually, Aristophanes' vigorous attack (*Ran.* 1491 ff.) shows it to have been proposed by Socrates. While Aristophanes may to some extent have used Socrates as a whipping-boy for the shortcomings of the Sophists, in this instance there is no other individual or school eligible to be the defendant unless it be Damon himself.

⁷ Though neither the speaker nor his opponent can be identified, the date indicates a pupil of Damon's, perhaps, as Wilhelm Crönert ("Die Hibehrede über die Musik," *Hermes* 44 [1909] 503-21) suggests, that Draco whom Olympiodorus (*Vit. Plat.*) mentions. Wilamowitz (*Griechische Verskunst* [Berlin 1921] 66) agrees with this, and with the other conclusions drawn by Crönert. Pickard-Cambridge (*The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* [Oxford 1953] 265) assigns the Hibeh discourse to "a writer of perhaps a century later than Aristotle," having apparently confused the date of the work itself with that of the papyrus sheet on which it appears.

⁸ Kathleen Freeman (*Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers* [Oxford 1946] 208) remarks that "the teaching summarized in the *Republic* is quoted as remembered from a lecture"; yet this hardly accounts for the strikingly large number of apologetic expressions. The Aristophanic Socrates mentions the rhythms of enoplius and dactyl (*Nub.* 648-51): this has been thought (e.g. by Wilamowitz [above, note 7] 59, who is most emphatic) to derive from Damonian theory, but as Kroll (above, note 3) 324

f.) that "musical styles (*tropoi*) are nowhere altered without changes in the most important laws of the state."

These passages give a decidedly mixed impression on second reading. They present Damon as a versatile, accomplished, and eminently fit associate for young men, a formidable expert in his field and thoroughly correct in his reasons for remaining (it would seem) a strict traditionalist. All appear to be compliments, but such is not necessarily the case. Versatility did not favorably impress Plato; instead, it annoyed him sufficiently to make him attack it again and again.⁹ Technical proficiency, furthermore, had at best a secondary importance in his eyes. It may be noted in this connection that his apparent hesitation in dealing with details of the Damonian theory of rhythmic ethos — a hesitation which cannot be due to genuine ignorance — must represent Plato either pretending simply as a joke not to know what in fact he knows very well, or for some reason anxious to avoid the appearance of having a specialized knowledge of musical theory, and willing even to indulge in gentle parody. The first alternative may be right; the second, however, can be shown to have a basis still more impressive than Socratic irony.

On this explanation, the natural reason for such a show of diffidence was Plato's unceasing distrust of professionalism in music. His political planning centers around the musically educated amateur, whose talents will be exercised within a restricted field of technique, one in which modal and rhythmic *metabolai* have been

rightly points out, the evidence is not clear-cut. While granting this, the present writer nevertheless believes in the correctness of Wilamowitz' contention; see above, note 6. Franz Buecheler (*Οἱ περὶ Δάμωνα*, *RhM* 40 [1885] 310) has "the impression . . . that Plato had before him a work bearing Damon's name" and containing "discussions of music in relation to ethics and popular education." This would be an additional reason, and one that is valid artistically, for Plato's having treated doctrines of rhythmic ethos as he did in the *Republic*. Buecheler (*ibid.*) notes that Susemihl, on Arist. *Pol.* 1340b.6 *οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες*, refers to Damon and his investigations, "which were probably set forth in a separate work." Ludwig Radermacher ("Ein Bruchstück des Damon," *WS* 52 [1938] 110 f.) contends that Damon's differentiation of the *ἡρῶς* from the dactyl (Plat. *Rep.* 400b.5), when taken together with Demetrius' citing of pure spondees to illustrate the *ἡρῶς*, indicates that the reference in Plato is to the spondee, as a type of foot, and not to the hexameter, which was called *ἡρῶς* from Aristotle's time on. If Radermacher is correct in believing that he has clarified a new item of Damonian theory, it may be that this example of terminology really was obscure to the average contemporary reader of the *Republic*.

⁹ Hippias of Elis is the most obvious target: one need only refer to the two short dialogues which bear his name. The civic ideal of Plato's city-state, it will be remembered, is each man doing one thing (*Rep.* 397e.2).

largely abolished. A Damon may perhaps be allowed to specialize,¹⁰ but the average man¹¹ may not do so; for this would be to forget that the proper function of musical training is educative (*Prot.* 312B.3 f.).¹² Thus the two extremes, versatility (represented most obviously by the Sophist Hippias of Elis) and specialization (perhaps as seen in the Sophist Prodicus of Ceos), are alike rejected in Plato's *paideia*; and certainly it cannot be stated with assurance that Damon's activities confined themselves to the mean which seemed proper in Plato's eyes.

The question of Damon's having been a Sophist is more easily

¹⁰ In the Híbeh discourse he is called a *ἀρμονικός*, a term which in context is meant to indicate absurdly narrow specialization. That the contents of this papyrus fragment originally were written well within Plato's lifetime can hardly be disputed; Crönert (above, note 7) 520 argues very plausibly for the year 390. He errs, however, in claiming that "the word *ἀρμονικός* . . . is conspicuously contrasted with *μουσικός*" in Plato. *Phaedrus* 268D.7-E.6, produced as evidence for this statement, neither proves it nor disproves it. The harmonists should not be lightly stripped of their respectability: these were the men responsible for preserving the old, genuine modes. One must conclude that the meaning of *ἀρμονικός* shifted, as the practice of temperament became steadily more dominant (starting at the close of the fifth century), to refer to narrow specialization. Its application to Damon in the Híbeh discourse is no more warranted than the recent description of him by R. C. Lodge (*Plato's Theory of Art* [London 1953] 92, note 41 to ch. 4, 152) as an expert researcher in mathematics and acoustics, seeking to discover "the mathematically objective bases for the community-approved scales." Professor Lodge seems unaware that less than thirty years ago Hermann Abert ("Die Stellung der Musik in der antiken Kultur," *Die Antike* 2 [1926] 136-54, esp. 141) pointed out, not for the first time, that Pythagoras' followers developed into two groups, one pursuing the mathematical theory of music and the other the ethos theory. Chief among the latter was Damon, who, as Abert says, "was responsible for a vital embodiment of the ethical-political view of music, as against the aesthetic view." Much of Abert's material was drawn upon by Louis Harap in "Some Hellenic Ideas on Music and Character," *Musical Quarterly* 24 (1938) 153-68, which may conveniently be used. On Plato's attitude toward the specialist, Sir Richard Livingstone (*Plato and Modern Education* [Cambridge 1944] 21) has said, "He had lived in a society of quick and subtle minds and did not think them enough: the ignorance which he dreaded was of a different kind and quite compatible with a high degree of intellectual expertise."

¹¹ Damon was set apart from the average Athenian even in respect of lineage: his name, with short alpha (so Plutarch, *Per.* 4), "is not an indigenous name of Dorian or Aeolian origin," Crönert (above, note 7) 510, note 1, points out, but an abbreviation of Damippus, Alcidas (-us) and similar forms. The articles in *RE* do not notice this, though Wilamowitz does (*Platon* [Berlin 1919] 1.15, note 1). In Greece it was normal for music teachers to be metics — this is the suggested arrangement even in the *Laws*; Damon, however, can hardly be described as a music teacher in the normal sense of *κῆθαριστής*, and it seems doubtful that he could have been of the metic class. Aristotle, at any rate, makes "Damonides" an Attic demesman (*Ath. Pol.* 27.4, cf. Lodge [above, note 10] 131, note 13 to ch. 6); so also Stephanus of Byzantium, in speaking of Damon (above, note 3).

¹² A similar argument is presented in this precise regard by Professor Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, tr. Gilbert Highet (New York 1943) 2.226 and note 104.

asked than answered.¹³ That the name was given him by Plutarch (*Per.* 4) and first of all by Isocrates (15.235) proves little or nothing: his connections, however, speak for themselves. Agathocles, his music teacher,¹⁴ was called a mighty Sophist in disguise by the Platonic Protagoras (*Prot.* 316E.1–3). Like Euripides, Damon was closely attached to Prodicus of Ceos, the most formidable hair-splitter of his day; and his own skill at subtle definition is stressed in the *Laches* with what seems thinly-veiled sarcasm on Plato's part.¹⁵

It would not seem unfair to conclude that Damon possessed at least the outward signs of a Sophist. One needs to show, nevertheless, that his actions tallied with appearances. It has already been noted that he taught *sophia*, skill not in playing the aulos or cithara (*Lach.* 194E.3–7) but in the distinction (197D.5 *diairein*) of terms as an eristic technique. He was no mere elementary teacher, or *kitharistês*, but a professor of musical theory and ethic (*mousikos*), and evidently of "logic" and political science as well.¹⁶ From Plato's point of view these subjects should reveal their interconnec-

¹³ The question is not even raised by Mario Untersteiner in *The Sophists*, tr. Kathleen Freeman (New York 1954). This learned and voluminous work, which has only recently become available in English, nowhere mentions Damon.

¹⁴ Rudolf Westphal's interposition of Lamprocles between Agathocles and Damon follows the scholiast on *Alc. I* 118c, but contradicts *Lach.* 180D.1. Pindar may well have been another of Agathocles' pupils, as Heinrich Ryffel states in "Eukosmia (Ein Beitrag zur Wiederherstellung des Areopagitikos des Damon)," *MusHelv* 4 (1947) 24. According to the Swiss scholar's reconstruction, Agathocles probably treated the problem of the new *τρόπος* with his pupils (it is true that in *Ol.* 3.4 f. Pindar speaks of a *νεοσίγαλον τρόπον* with which the Muse has provided him); and while Pindar courted the Muse, Damon spurned this new "turn" on ethical, pedagogical and political grounds. One may tentatively define *τρόπος* as the characteristic turning or contour of a melody, or again as the kinetic aspect of *ἁρμονία*; better than any single term in English is the German *Melodiewendung*.

¹⁵ *Lach.* 197D.1–5, where Damon is said to be much like Prodicus of Ceos, whose passion for verbal distinctions roused Plato's amused contempt. Protagoras is never treated thus in the dialogue which bears his name, though considerable gentle humor can be discerned.

¹⁶ In view of Damon's notable political activity, it may be relevant to note Prodicus' view (*Vors.* 84B 6) that Sophists were partly philosophers and partly statesmen, combining the best qualities of both. On the many references in the dialogues to Prodicus and his courses in definition, the cheapest of which Socrates attended, see *Vors.* 84A 11, 13–18. Kathleen Freeman (above, note 8) 372 remarks that "Prodicus was not alone in teaching this subject: Protagoras also taught it, and so apparently did Damon." See also Crönert (above, note 7) 510 f., for a discussion of Prodicus' *Ἐπαι* and possible references involving Damon, whom Crönert believes to have carried on Prodicus' work. On the plausibility of Diogenes Laertius' claim that Socrates studied under Damon see above, note 6.

tion through a unity of purpose and deportment. This evidently was true of Damon's pronouncements, for we cannot think that Plato would have misquoted him; but if the historical evidence can be believed,¹⁷ his political counselling had no essential relationship to his musical theorizing. That it was impressive in itself may be inferred from the fact of his eventual banishment; Plutarch refers to Damon's *deinotês* (*Per.* 4) and his uncommon powers of political thought (*Arist.* 1, *Nic.* 6, both probably echoes of Isocrates, 15.235).¹⁸ Plato (*Alc. I* 118c.5 f.) is noncommittal.

The problem remains of Damon's statement, flatly endorsed by Socrates in the *Republic* (424c.5 f.), that innovation in music always is attended by the most radical kind of innovation in the laws of the state. Socrates' meaning is plain;¹⁹ but possibly it should be taken into consideration that these words, once they are removed from the Platonic context, do not necessarily constitute, either explicitly or implicitly, any indictment of such musical change. It might be argued that one thinks they do because of Socrates' strictures, which surround the quotation and seem to echo it.

Perhaps Damon was in very truth a champion of the conservative tradition, as has recently been argued;²⁰ but Plutarch (*Mus.* 16, p. 157 Reinach) certainly states that "Damon of Athens is said to have discovered the relaxed Lydian, a mode opposite to Mixolydian but

¹⁷ Its convincingness depends mainly upon two assumptions: first, that the *Constitution of the Athenians* is a genuine work of Aristotle's; second, that Plutarch used reliable information. The former, at least, will be questioned by few scholars. Kenyon (on *Ath. Pol.* 27.4) argued that Plutarch had distorted and wrongfully expanded Aristotle's reference to "Damonides," apparently not noticing that several of Plutarch's statements, even in their vocabulary, can be traced directly back to Isocrates (15.235), who comments on Damon's — not Damonides' — political importance; and Isocrates' young manhood coincided with Damon's *floruit*.

¹⁸ Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 27.4) says that Damonides advised Pericles to pay jurors out of public funds, arguing cynically that the money already belonged to them in any case, and that his position of powerful influence with Pericles later caused him to be ostracized. I believe Professor Raubitschek (above, note 3) is right in holding that Aristotle here mistakenly assigns Damon's ostracism to his father, while remaining accurate in the rest of his statement.

¹⁹ The general point involved is made clear by Professor Jaeger (above, note 12) 2.226: "The Greeks felt a fundamental alteration in the structure of music to be a political revolution, because it changed the spirit of education, on which the state depended." So also Walther Vetter (s.v. "Musik," *RE* 16.835): "Die Lenkung des Staates erfolgt letzten Endes auf musikalischer Grundlage."

²⁰ Heinrich Ryffel, in *METABOAH HIOITEION. Der Wandel der Staatsverfassungen*, "Noctes Romanae" 2 (Bern 1949), seeks to demonstrate this in great detail, finding traces of Damon's views in Isocrates and a number of other writers.

much like Ionian."²¹ If Plutarch is relaying an authentic tradition, then Plato (*Rep.* 398E.9–399A.3) by indirection deliberately banned from Kallipolis a discovery of Damon's. Even if the ascription is erroneous, one would not have expected a specific instance of modal innovation, real or apparent, to be assigned to an unlikely candidate.²² Miss Kathleen Freeman (above, note 8) 208 argues that the ascription "can hardly be true," since Plato stigmatized this mode and Damon commended Dorian. In the light of Aristotle's outspokenly frank disagreement with Plato over the ethos of Phrygian, her argument seems less than conclusive, though admittedly one cannot know with certainty that Plutarch was not inaccurate.

The view proposed here is that Plato saw Damon as an ally, but a dangerous one. Damon had brilliantly grasped the basic principles (as Plato saw them) of paideutic ethos in music, and had expanded his researches well beyond anything achieved by his predecessors (above, notes 5, 10, 16). He had already said a number of the things about the meaning of music which Plato felt needed saying, so that, on the one hand, his work could not be overlooked and, on the other, it could be used most conveniently.²³ He was not, however, a man after the model of the *Republic* and *Laws*. More than half in love with Sophism, he did not tune his heart to his music: there was not within him that "finest of all *harmoniai*" which Laches praises so eloquently (*Lach.* 188c.6–d.8). Damon

²¹ See von Jan, *RE* 4.2073–74 and *Jahrb. f. class. Philol.* 95 (1867) 815; see also Reinach's note on the passage in the Weil-Reinach edition (Paris 1900).

²² "Da es zu den Eigentümlichkeiten D.s gehörte," says von Jan (*RE* 4.2072), "die Bewegungen des Rhythmus und der Melodie in Zusammenhang zu bringen mit entsprechenden Regungen in der Seele des Hörers (Athen. XIV 628c), gehen wir gewiss nicht fehl, wenn wir ausser dem, was Platon in der Republik III cap. 11 über den Eindruck verschiedener Rhythmen mit ausdrücklicher Berufung auf D. sagt, auch das meiste und beste von dem, was wir im vorhergehenden Capitel über die Eigenschaften der verschiedenen Tonarten lesen, auf Anschauungen D.s zurückführen." Then, in col. 2074: "Das (i.e. the relaxed Lydian) war eine Stimmung, welche den Namen *ἐπανεμένη* (Plut.), *ἀνεμένη* (Aristot.) oder *χαλαρά* (Platon) in vollem Masse verdiente." Surely one cannot have it both ways.

²³ Professor Jaeger (above, note 12) 2.227, note 110, holds that Plato has Socrates appeal to Damon as the great authority on *τὸ πρέπον* (Aristides Quintilianus, p. 6 M., says Damon defined music as the *τέχνη* of "what is becoming [*πρέποντος*] in words and gestures") because "he felt that Damon was the real originator of the theory of ethos in music on which Plato builds his system of *paideia*." The present writer attempts to show that the theory of ethos clearly antedates Damon, and that Plato's views do not simply echo Damon's, as maintained most recently by H. Koller, *Die Mimesis in der Antike*, "Diss. Bernenses" 1.5 (Bern 1954).

was, apparently, a research scholar whose practical, active side found creative expression mainly in the political intrigues of Periclean Athens; as a scholar, he rejoiced in technicalities and categories, though he was not lost in them. The musical *paideia* of Plato's state planning, however, is deliberately kept simple. In Kallipolis the welter of modes and rhythms which Plato saw to be in use about him would no longer exist, though the *Laws* does perhaps allow them back, at least to some extent.²⁴

One might object here that if Damon had been such as the present writer seeks to portray him, Plato would never have called him an eminently fit associate for young men. To suppose this is to forget that not every pronouncement in the dialogues is delivered *ex cathedra*. Plato met the demands of dramatic realism with a varying but generally high level of success: this means that any statement requires to be interpreted within its context, especially when the speaker is someone other than Socrates. It is thus of interest to note that the tribute to Damon which has now come under consideration was delivered by Nicias.²⁵ To the fourth-century Athenian, indeed to any Greek with the slightest knowledge of the strategy used in the Peloponnesian War, Nicias was the man whose deference to superstition deprived Athens of her last chance to escape disaster in Sicily; this one impression must have dominated all others. What he actually or reportedly said about anyone would inevitably have been discounted in Plato's day. His praise of Damon, then, does not seem to cast any serious doubt on the merit of the arguments advanced here.

A number of points have now emerged on which there was a marked lack of accord between Plato and Damon. The most telling difference of all, in my opinion, is the difference in their attitudes toward musical innovation. For Plato, perfection was necessarily static, and his educational program represented perfection;²⁶

²⁴ The *Laws* is neither so specific nor so harsh as the *Republic* in its handling of modality. Several passages, notably 670A.6–E.7, can hardly be explained except on the supposition that a variety of modes would be permitted. Lodge (above, note 10) 221 argues for the necessity of modal variety even in the ideal city-state of the *Republic*.

²⁵ The immediate circumstances are that Nicias says Socrates has introduced Damon to him and recommended him as a tutor for Nicias' son (though the complimentary references are Nicias' own addition); and we know that neither Nicias nor Laches was very redoubtable intellectually. Commendation from Socrates himself would be another matter.

²⁶ The relevant arguments of the *Republic* are summarized by Professor Jaeger (above, note 12) 2.237 and notes 173–76.

such evidence as we possess regarding Damon points to a divergent opinion. He was a great figure in his own right, and Plato paid tribute to what he had achieved as a musicologist;²⁷ nonetheless, the alliance between these brilliant thinkers was never anything but uneasy.

The most direct single clash occurred over the possibility of an ethos of justice. Damon's affirmative view, as recorded by Philodemus of Gadara, celebrated Epicurean philosopher-critic of Cicero's day, has already been quoted, and Philodemus' comments may now be added. To connect justice with music is absurd, he counters (*Mus.* 4.24.9–36, p. 90 Kemke); if Plato had claimed that music conduces to justness, we should ask for proof, but in fact he speaks differently, holding that the just has analogies with the musical; he claims neither that the musical man is just nor that the just man is musical, nor yet that either aspect assists the other as regards the two special fields of knowledge.

The two fields come closest to explicit connection in a statement in the *Laws* (700D.4 f.) that poets have shown themselves ignorant regarding *to dikaion tês Mousês*; an analogy of justice with the *harmonia* in music may be found in the *Republic* (443C.9–E.2, esp. D.5 ff.). Except for the instance from the *Laws*, Plato's connecting of music with justice merely introduces the former in order to illustrate the latter. Thus he does use analogy, but without making explicit any bond of inner relation. One may question, however, whether he does not of necessity presuppose the bond, e.g. in the *Republic*, where political decay is attributed to the neglect of *mousikê*. Injustice eminently constitutes a part of such decay. The point can be more clearly illustrated from the *Laws* (701A.5–7), in Plato's express statement that musical license offers a foothold for a universal pretension to expertise in all fields, for lawlessness and for license generally — qualities which, as he goes on to show, have proved the ruin of the whole state.

Philodemus' objection nevertheless can hardly be called baseless, in view of the regular omission of justice from Platonic discussions of the qualities portrayed musically and through the dance. Both *Republic* and *Laws* speak consistently of courage and moderation, associating them respectively with the manly and the womanly nature, and with the Dorian and Phrygian modes; justice never

²⁷ This (i.e. *μουσικός*) is his title even in Philodemus (p. 7 K.). Reinach (above, note 21) xiii and note 1 concisely discusses the use of *μουσικός*, *ἁρμονικός* and *κανωνικός*.

receives a like category.²⁸ The omission can be explained: to permit only two modes creates an embarrassing problem for the introduction of a third cardinal virtue; again, Plato's best-known later conception of justice presents it as subsuming the main virtues, not merely as coördinate with them.²⁹ The point to be noticed, however, is that Platonic theory shows complete independence of the Damonian in this respect. Very possibly Plato builds on Damon's basis, but the end toward which he builds represents an original achievement.

The final grounds for disbelief in any simple equation of Platonic with Damonian views on musical ethos become evident upon examining Aristides Quintilianus' treatise on music. In 1937 Rudolf Schäfke published a translation of this work into German, with an extensive introduction and copious notes.³⁰ If his arguments are to be believed — and there seem only a few instances in which one might feel a continuing skepticism — references to Damonian theories are implicit throughout the text. Regarding the modes there can be no possibility of doubt, since Aristides refers to Damon both at the beginning and at the end of his observations on this vital topic.

In summing up the Damonian musical doctrines in Aristides as they relate to ethos, it may be said that they show a strong cosmological basis.³¹ (4) Each individual note has a distinctive psychic and ethical content, and thus a separate ethos (p. 13 Meibom); hence the signal importance (p. 96 M.) of *petteia*, or note selection, in melodic composition. Aristides claims that in "the modes handed down by Damon"³² one may find that in the note-sequences the female or again the male notes predominate or diminish or are

²⁸ In the celebrated description of the ethos of Dorian and Phrygian (*Rep.* 399A.5–C.4) *dikaos* and *dikaioσύνη* seem prominent through their absence.

²⁹ This is the view, found at the end of Book IV of the *Republic*, that justice represents the "harmony" of the other virtues. The *Laws*, however, presents justice merely as one of four cardinal virtues (631B.3 ff., esp. C.5–D.1), which are indeed led and held in unity by the virtue first mentioned, namely *φρόνησις* (631C.6, cf. D.5 *τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν*; so also 688B.2 ff., 963A.1–9).

³⁰ *Aristeides Quintilianus Von der Musik* (Berlin 1937). The decision not to provide a critical text is greatly to be regretted.

³¹ Bracketed numerals (4) through (7) complete the series of excerpts from Damonian doctrine which were begun at the opening of this article. See also below, note 35.

³² p. 95 M. These are not always full *ἀρμονίαι* in the later sense; some approximate much more closely to a bare tetrachordal sequence. As a group, they are likened by Meibom (p. 302) to melodic exercises (*μελωδίαι, Übungen*); Schäfke (above, note 30) 289 agrees.

not present at all, "obviously because a different arrangement³³ was useful according to the nature of each particular (type of) soul" (p. 95 M.). Further, "Some of the ancients called rhythm masculine and melody feminine" (p. 43 M.).³⁴ (5) Stringed instruments correspond to the ethereal, dry and single-natured realm of the cosmic structure, and likewise to the relevant portion of the soul's nature; "wind instruments, on the other hand, show analogies with the windy, damp and changeable sphere . . . (and) are prone to unrestrained modulation" (p. 107 M.). (6) The numbers one through twelve have metaphysical significance, and through the *harmonia* the whole cosmos is bound into one (p. 121 M.). In music the corporeal mingles with "the exactness and sublimity" which derive from the principle of number (p. 126 M.). (7) The genera (enharmonic, chromatic, diatonic) correspond to types of psychic or physical nature (p. 133 M.); the music of the spheres has the enharmonic as its genus (p. 149 M.).

Between the teachings of Plato and the doctrines which have been presented here as either certainly or probably Damonian, there exists some clear measure of agreement. It is not the writer's purpose to seek to prove that Plato ignored Damon's work, a position which would be far from the truth. What does need emphasis is the degree to which Plato's thinking on musical ethos shows a creative independence. His positive contributions cannot be dealt with adequately in anything short of a separate treatise: what will be attempted here is simply a series of comments on Plato's position with regard to certain Damonian beliefs mentioned thus far. In a number of instances this comparison has already been drawn.³⁵

(1) This belief of Damon's contains two hypotheses. The second requires no elaboration — it stands as the credo of musical ethic; but the first maintains a new doctrine,³⁶ one which recognizes

³³ The word is again *ἀρμονία*, most often rendered as "mode." Its use here illustrates unusually well the root meaning of fitting or arranging.

³⁴ Aristides (pp. 76–78 M.) also attributes masculine and feminine elements to the soul, without attempting to prove his claim.

³⁵ The bracketed numerals which follow correspond to those used above for the doctrines of Damon and of Aristides. See also above, note 31.

³⁶ The same idea, as stated by Ptolemy (*Harm.* 3.7), is given by Vetter (*RE* 16.839) as the basis of the theory of ethos; he attributes its origin to the Pythagoreans. Abert (*Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik* [Leipzig 1899] 5–7) documents this origin in great detail, pointing out that in the Pythagorean view music can produce equilibrium in the soul precisely because the soul moves in accordance with an ordered sequence of numerical relations. The latter correspond, according to Ptolemy (*ibid.* 3.4), to the *ἁρμονικὸι τῶν φθόγγων λόγοι*, the harmonic ratios of musical sounds.

the interchange of cause and effect between the soul and its manifestations. We tend to think of Damon, and for that matter of all others who during antiquity concerned themselves with musical ethos, as believing mainly that the soul receives musical influences from without; too easily forgotten is the awareness that purposive action originates in the soul.³⁷ Damon's point has genuine value, and the two hypotheses form part of a systematic doctrine which proved of the greatest advantage to Plato.

(2) Damon's theory of similarity indicates some form of mimesis. What Aristides says about note selection and the attribution of masculine or feminine natures to individual notes, modes, genera and the like suggests the presuppositions involved in this mimesis. So far as one can tell, Plato's solution of this problem is altogether different: he says of Dorian and Phrygian that they "imitate the tones and accents of a brave man" or a temperate man (*Rep.* 399A.3–C.4). This may fairly be called a simple and sensible approach, in comparison with Damon's esoteric symbolism, which is comparable to the cosmological fantasies of Hindu and Arabic musical theory.

(3) (This point has already been discussed.)

(4) To the best of the writer's knowledge, Plato nowhere assigns individual notes an ethos: the mode is the smallest musical unit to be thus treated. Nor do the dialogues show any concern with note selection, though this was a vital part of Damonian practice, if Aristides has interpreted the ancient scale-sequences correctly. As for associating masculine and feminine characteristics, Damon and Plato both did so, but in largely different ways. The former assigned them to individual notes,³⁸ to modes, to genera and to musical instruments, while the latter allows none of these categories except

³⁷ The *ἄνθρωπος μουσικός*, as Vetter says (*RE* 16. 841), is such "nicht auf (i.e. in virtue of) die Bewegungen der Töne, vielmehr auf die durch die Töne im Innern des Menschen ausgelösten Bewegungen. . . . Die in den *πράξεις* sich ausdrückende *ἐνέργεια* aber ist ohne weiteres *ἡθικὸν καὶ ποιεῖ ἦθος* (Ps.-Arist. *Probl.* 19.29)."

³⁸ Such differentiation is known to modern musicologists. In Java, for example, the notes of a central scale can be found divided between two instruments according to the male-female cosmic antithesis: one instrument has the even tones resulting from a cycle of fifths, while the other has the odd tones (see Robert Lachmann, *Musik des Orients* [Breslau 1929] 22). Speaking of these "male" and "female" notes in Greek musical theory, Wilamowitz (above, note 7) 64 warns against assuming that Damon was himself a composer, and points out that he only cited and criticized the modes. It does seem very probable, at any rate, that he was not a practising professional; see above, note 2.

that of the modes. For Plato, Dorian expressed manly courage, Phrygian the discretion or moderation which he felt to be woman's finest quality, though he saw that neither trait was limited to a single sex; the other modes he banished from Kallipolis as demoralizing. Aristides merely calls Phrygian "mediate" in character (p. 96 M.) — that is, a mean between manly Dorian and effeminate Lydian, as the context shows. If this description goes back to Damon, yet another point of difference between him and Plato becomes apparent; if not, one surmises that Aristides may have been led to attempt a compromise between the directly opposed opinions of Plato and Aristotle regarding the true ethos of Phrygian.

As for calling rhythm masculine and melody feminine, Plato makes no such distinction. He supposes rather that the nature of the sexes will be expressed in either case by suitable rhythms, even as by suitable modes. Rhythm and mode usually are mentioned together throughout the dialogues; rhythm is, if anything, a little in the background on one or two occasions.³⁹ In this connection it may be noted once again that in the *Republic* (400B.2–C.5) modal ethos is treated boldly and in detail, while rhythmic ethos appears to be a more obscure problem, requiring Damon's special technical knowledge.

(5) Cosmological analogies are never applied to musical instruments in the dialogues. Plato passes judgment essentially according to the simplicity or complexity (as permitting modulation) of a given instrument (*Rep.* 377, 399); the techniques of performance which he attacks are those which destroy this ideal simplicity, such as *heterophônia* and *poikilia* (*Leg.* 812D.1–E.6).

(6) Plato and Damon have much in common as regards number symbolism, a Pythagorean inheritance which seems to trace back to Asiatic origins. The *Timaeus* and *Republic* both contain highly puzzling uses of number; the former also shows a cosmogony worked out in accordance with geometrical musical ratios.⁴⁰ It does not seem, however, that Plato duplicated Damon's approach, to judge from the limited indications in Aristides Quintilianus.

(7) The musical training laid down in the *Republic* and *Laws* observes such strict limits as apparently to exclude altogether the

³⁹ In the *Republic*, the use of suitable modes is discussed at some length (399A.3–C.4), while selection of corresponding rhythms is dealt with in a few lines (399E.8–11).

⁴⁰ See most recently Arthur Ahlvers, *Zahl und Klang bei Platon*, "Noctes Romanae" vol. 6 (Bern 1952).

possibility of genera. The myth of Er similarly omits to assign any genus to the song of the Sirens on the whorls of Necessity's spindle.⁴¹

The broad conclusions which the writer believes to follow from the evidence presented above can be briefly set forth. Plato used Damonian theory, but he used it critically, adopting some points and discarding many others, doubtless with compromises not now perceptible. Most important of all, the majority of Damon's main beliefs appear nowhere in the dialogues, while the most striking Platonic speculations (e.g. his admirable explanation of the origin of modes and rhythms in man's speech and gestures, respectively) betray little or no indebtedness to Damon. It is time we discarded the old idea of Plato as an unoriginal musical theorist, a mere Damonian echo. Where predecessors had laid a secure foundation, he built on the past; but he built powerfully, daringly, and above all with individualism. We have granted Plato much in other realms of *sophia*: by taking thought, we may add a cubit to his stature in musical theory as well.

⁴¹ The genera were of comparatively late development in the history of Greek music, and Plato archaizes determinedly in his musical planning. F. Greif, "Études sur la musique antique (cont.)," *REG* 23 (1910) 32 f., says that Plato cared nothing about enharmonic or chromatic, preferring diatonic; this was anciently the claim of Theo Smyrnaeus (*Mus.* 12). Ahlvers (above, note 40) 46-62 argues at length in an attempt to prove that Plato prized enharmonic very highly; his methods seems circuitous and circumstantial, nor does it offer anything new unless one accepts his ingenious interpretation of the creation-scale in the *Timaeus*. A. E. Taylor (above, note 3) 136-46, esp. 142 ff., reasonably argues that this scale is diatonic, and the failure on Plato's part to mention any interval smaller than the *λείμμα* certainly seems to be supporting evidence for Taylor's view. The comparative lateness of the system of genera is indicated by the tradition which ascribes the introduction of chromatic into tragedy to Agathon (Plut. *Quaest. Conv.* 3.1.1). Actually it first appeared in the sixth century, with the citharode Lysander of Sicyon. Though it was admitted neither into choral lyric nor (despite Agathon) into tragic drama, the writers of dithyrambs and citharodic *νόμοι* quickly adopted it. On the antiquity of the other two genera, see R. P. Winnington-Ingram, "The Spondeion Scale," *CQ* 22 (1928) 34.